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POINT I 
THE FACTS SHOW THAT DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY 
DROVE WHEN ALCOHOL IMPAIRED HER ABILITIES 
Defendant's argument that there is no evidence 
that drinking impaired her driving is not true. Defendant's 
blood alcohol level was .10. (R. 601.) After the accident, 
defendant stated she was going to leave the scene without 
waiting for police. (R. 617, p. 23.) She acted "as if she 
had been drinking" (Id.) and had trouble standing up. (Id.) 
She had trouble locating her license. (R. 60 3.) She either 
failed to honor a stop sign or pulled from that stop sign 
without seeing an approaching car that was in plain sight. 
(R. 617, p. 16.) This is not a case where the sole evidence 
of impairment is the fact that the legislative standard was 
exceeded. 
Defendant just came from a wine and cheese party. 
(Defendant's Brief, p. 22.) This is not a case where the 
drinking occurred so long before the accident that it might 
be argued that the driver believed her system had been 
purged of the alcohol. Defendant's behavior after the 
accident involving wanting to leave the scene, difficulty 
finding things, and difficulty standing further shows 
conscious awareness of her condition. It also shows that 
alcohol impaired her driving ability. 
POINT II 
DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
CAN BE CONDUCT IN RECKLESS DISREGARD 
OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS REGARDLESS OF 
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ACCIDENT OCCURS 
OR THE AMOUNT BY WHICH THE STATUTORY LIMIT IS EXCEEDED 
The trial court decided the punitive damages issue 
on a summary judgment motion. Therefore, it was defendant's 
burden to show the reasonable men could not differ on the 
facts. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
non-moving party need not prove his case in order to avoid a 
summary judgment motion. 
To sustain her burden, defendant did not present 
any expert testimony to explain her concept of being 
"slightly drunk." Likewise, defendant did not present 
testimony to support her argument that her "slight intoxica-
tion" was neither malicious nor a contributing cause of the 
accident. Rather, defendant merely relies on inferences. 
She infers that she was not "malicious" because her alcohol 
level was only .02 percent above the legislative standard. 
She further infers that the alcohol was not a contributory 
factor because this was a typical kind of accident. Reason-
able men could draw contrary inferences from the facts. 
Defendant did not meet her burden of showing that no genuine 
issue of fact existed. 
2 
Where courts have bothered to determine some 
minimum threshold for awarding punitive damages in drunk 
driving cases, most have determined that drunk driving, in 
and of itself, is enough to get to the jury on punitive 
damages. Anderson v. Amundson, 354 N.W. 895 (Minn. App. 
1984); Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 N.W.2d 406 (Io. 1974); 
Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1976); Colligan v. 
Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 
167 (N. Mex. App. 1971). 
Punitive damages have also been awarded where the 
degree of intoxication was unknown; not considered important 
enough to be specified in the opinion; or where the issue of 
intoxication was contested. Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 
N.W.2d 406 (Io. 1984); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 
(N.M. 1970); Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973). 
Additionally, alcohol can cause a driver to rear 
end a car or cause some ordinary accident to occur as easily 
as it can cause driving on the wrong side of the road. 
Thus, punitive damages were awarded in rear-end collisions 
in Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 352 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. 1961); 
Higginbotham v. O'Keefe, 340 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Co. App. 
1960); and Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1976). 
They have been awarded in ordinary intersection accidents. 
Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (N.M. App. 1971) and where 
there was a failure to yield the right-of-way. Adams v« 
Hunter, 343 F.Supp. 1284 (D. So. Car. 1972). Because 
3 
alcohol causes accidents to happen in every way imaginable, 
there is no sense requiring that an alcohol related accident 
occur in some particularly negligent manner before punitive 
damages can be awarded. No other court has imposed such a 
requirement. 
The legislature has set a blood alcohol level 
which creates a crime. That legislation reflects public 
policy. Any requirement that an alcohol related accident 
occur in a particular negligent manner would be at odds 
with the legislature's policy. It would also be at odds 
with the reality that alcohol can cause common accidents to 
occur as well as more spectacular kinds of accidents. 
The issue of whether the punitive damages standard 
is satisfied is a jury question. Elkington v. Fousty 618 
P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) Tortsf §908, 
Comment d. If its is true the defendant was only "slightly" 
drunk, that can be fairly argued to the jury. The jury will 
possibly award modest punitive damages if a driver is 
"slightly" drunk. In addition,it is for the jury to consid-
er whether there are sufficient mitigating factors present 
Section 41-6-44(1), Utah Code Ann.; 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section 
for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08% or 
greater by weight, or who is under the infuence of alcohol 
or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any 
drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of 
safely driving a vehcile, to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state. 
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to award no punitive damages. To hold as a matter of law 
that drunk driving alone is not enough to get to the jury 
would fly in the face of the expressed public policy of this 
state and would involve the court in endless, arbitrary line 
drawing. 
POINT III 
A JURY COULD FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT 
FIT WITHIN UTAH'S PUNITIVE DAMAGE STANDARD 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 
P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); VonHake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 
1985); and, Atkins, Wright and Miles v. Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph, 20 Utah Adv. Reports 20 (1985) were 
all decided after McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). Each case expressly states that 
either actual malice (malice directed at one particular 
person) or implied malice (reckless disregard of the rights 
of others) can satisfy the punitive damage standard. 
Defendant argues that her conduct cannot fit 
within the implied malice standard because she did not 
knowingly intend to hurt plaintiff. However, that argument 
misses the entire distinction between actual malice and 
implied malice. Knowing disregard of the rights of others 
certainly may exist even though there is no conscious intent 
to injure anyone. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 
P.2d 1179, 1186-87 (Utah 1983). 
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Intentionally driving while under the influence of 
alcohol and drinking to intoxication intending to later 
drive squarely fit within the "knowing disregard of the 
rights of others" standard, e.g., Anderson v. Amundson, 354 
N.W.2d 895 (Minn. App. 1984); Huff v. Chrismonn, 315 S.E.2d 
711 (N.C. App. 1984); Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854 
(Cal. 1979); Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or. 1973); Adams 
v. Hunter, 343 F.Supp. 1284 (D. S.C. 1972); Walezak v. 
Healy, 280 A.2d 728 (Del. 1971); Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 
352 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. 1961); Infeld v. Sullivan, 199 A.2d 673 
(Conn. 1964); Madison v. Wigal, 153 N.E.2d 90 (111. App. 
1958). 
As stated in Holmes v. Hollingsworth, supra.: 
"When Miller imbibed alcoholic liquor he 
knew that he was taking into his stomach 
a substance that would stupefy his 
senses, retard his muscular and nervous 
reaction, and impair, if not destroy, 
the perfect co-ordination of eye, brain 
and muscles that is essential to safe 
driving. After Miller voluntarily 
rendered himself unfit to operate a car 
properly he undertook to drive his 
automobile, a potentially lethal ma-
chine, down a well traveled highway. 
His conduct in doing this was distinctly 
anti-social, and the jury was amply 
authorized in saying by their verdict 
that he was exhibiting a 'wanton disre-
gard of the rights and safety of oth-
ers.,M (352 S.W.2d at 99) 
POINT IV 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED 
IN ADDITION TO ANY CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
Defendant argues that punitive damages are not 
necessary because drunk drivers are subject to criminal 
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penalties. (See Brief of Respondent at pp. 27-32.) It 
should be sufficient to note that criminal penalties have 
not stopped the carnage I Nor did they deter the defendant. 
In spite of Utah's tough laws, many are not deterred and 
flout the criminal system. 
Those courts which have considered the argument 
that punitive damages should not be awarded in drunk driving 
cases because criminal penalties exist have consistently 
rejected the argument. Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or. 
1973); Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); Svejcara 
v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (New Mex. App. 1971); Miller v. 
Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 2983 (Ark. 1948); Pratt v. Duck, 191 
S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. App. 1945). These courts have determined 
that the carnage caused by drunk driving requires use of the 
law's full arsenal. 
The Oregon Supreme Court expressed its belief that 
punitive damages add to the deterrent which the criminal law 
provides in these words. 
Indeed, the fact of common knowledge 
that the drinking driver is the cause of 
so many of the more serious automobile 
accidents is strong evidence in itself 
to support the need for all possible 
means of deterring persons from driving 
automobiles after drinking, involving 
exposure to awards of punitive damages 
in the event of accidents. 
It may be debatable whether either 
awards of punitive damages or the 
imposition of criminal penalties will 
effectively deter persons from driving 
after drinking. However, in the absence 
of a showing of substantial evidence to 
the contrary, we are not prepared to 
hold that law enforcement officials and 
7 
courts, who have a heavy responsibility 
in this area, are wrong in their present 
apparent assumption that both criminal 
penalties and awards of punitive damages 
may have at least some deterrent effect 
in dealing with this serious problem. 
We are also not aware of any good 
reasons why punitive damages should not 
have as much deterrent effect upon this 
type of wanton and reckless conduct as 
upon other types of conduct in which 
awards of punitive damages are tradi-
tionally approved by the courts. 
Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211, 
214-215 (Or. 1973). 
The Florida Supreme Court expressed a similar 
belief that the state's public policy required use of 
punitive damages in the drunk driving context. 
The distinctions articulated in labeling 
particular conduct as "simple negli-
gence" , and "willful and wanton miscon-
duct" are best viewed as statements of 
public policy. . .We would deceive 
ourselves, however, if we viewed these 
distinctions as finite legal categories 
and permitted the characterization alone 
to cloud the policies they were created 
to foster. Our guide is not to be found 
in the grammar, but rather in the policy 
of the state in regard to highway 
accidents. From that perspective, we 
see that the courts and the legislature 
have evolved the notion that drunk 
drivers menace the public safety and are 
to be discouraged by punishment. 
Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d, 
922-924, (Fla. 1976) . 
New York courts have recognized that: 
"the possible imposition of a court 
penalty in the form of punitive damages 
may well be, at least to some drivers, a 
more effective deterrent than any 
possible criminal penalty." 
Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 
310 (1973). 
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POINT V 
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES DOES NOT 
VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROVISIONS 
The overwhelming majority of jurisdiction that 
have ruled on the issue have held that punitive damages can 
be awarded even though the same conduct could also be 
2 
punished criminally. 25 C.J.S. "Damages" §122 at n. 10. 
Moody v. State ex rel. Payne, 355 So.2d 1116 (Ala. 
1978); Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 
(1948) ; ~Bundy v. Maginess, 76 Cal. 532, 18 P. 668 (1888); 
E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 42 Colo. App. 497, 596 
P.2d 413 (1979); Jefferson v. Adams, 4 Harr. 321 (Del. 
1845); Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117 (1882); Klam v. Koppel, 
63 Idaho 171, 118 P.2d 729 (1941); Brannon v. Silvernail, 81 
111. 434 (1876); Hauser v. Griffith, 102 Iowa 215, 71 N.W. 
223 (1897); Donley v. Amerada Petroleum, 152 Kan. 518, 106 
P.2d 652 (1940); Doerhoefer v. Shewmaker, 123 Ky. 646, 97 
S.W. 7 (1906); Johnson v. Smith, 64 Me. 553 (1875); Elliot 
v. Van Buren, 3 Mich. 49" (1875) ; Boetcher v. Staples, 27 
Minn. 308, 7 N.W. 263 (1880); Wagner v. Gibbs, 80 Miss. 53, 
31 So. 434 (1902); Summers v. Keller, 152 Mo. App. 626, 133 
S.W. 1180 (1911); mod on other grounds 262 Mo. 324, 171 S.W. 
336 (1914); Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman 
Associates, Inc., 108 N.J. Super 137, 260 A.2d 248 (1970); 
Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (1971); 
Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc.2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); 
Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911); 
Smithhisler v. Putter, 157 Ohio St. 497, 105 N.E.2d 868 
(1952); Roshak v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560 P.2d 275 
(1977); Wirsing v. SmithT"222 Pa. 8, 70 A. 906 (1908); 
Edwards v. Wessinger, 65 S.C. 161, 43 S.E. 518 (1903); Pratt 
v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945); Jones v. 
Ross, 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022 (1943); Goldsmith's 
Administrator v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488, 17 A. 1010 (1889); 
Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104 S.E. 800 (1920); 
Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W.VA. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895); Fahrenberg 
v. Tengel, 96 Wis.2d 211, 291 N.W.2d 516 (1980); Cosgriff v. 
Miller, 10 Wyo. 190, 68 P. 206 (1902). 
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Several of the drunk driving cases have specifi-
cally rejected the double jeopardy defense. Svejcara v. 
Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (New. Mex. App. 1971); Miller v. 
Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 293 (Ark. 1948); Pratt v. Duck, 191 
S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. App. 1945). 
Numerous Utah cases have awarded punitive damages 
in situations where the same conduct could also be punished 
criminally. e.g., Holdaway v. Hull, 505 P.2d 295 (Utah 
1973); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Evans v. 
Garsfad, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah 1952). Indeed, many other kinds 
of Utah cases where punitive damages were allowed would 
probably also be crimes if prosecutors had known of them or 
desired to prosecute them. 
Courts which have rejected the double jeopardy 
defense have done so on various grounds. Many courts have 
pointed out that the term "jeopardy" has a special meaning 
which has been applied only to criminal actions. E.F. 
Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 42 Colo. App. 497, 596 P.2d 
413 (1979); Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 
(1971); Brown v. Swinefad, 44 Wis. 282 (1878). 
Other courts have noted that the criminal statutes 
are to punish a defendant for a wrong done to the public in 
general, while civil actions arise out of a wrong to a 
particular person with punitive damages to be awarded as an 
example to deter others. e.g., Moody v. State ex rel. 
Payne, 355 So.2d 1116 (Ala. 1978); Morris v. McNacNab, 135 
A.2d 657 (1957); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (N.M. 
App. 1971); Pratt v. Duck, 191 S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. App. 1946). 
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In these civil cases, it is the actions of a private litigant, 
not the power and resources of the state, that begins the 
process. 
Further, the requirements for imposing punitive 
damages are different from those required for conviction of the 
criminal offense. One cannot be required to pay punitive 
damages unless he inflicts actual damages. Maw v. Weber Basin 
Waterconservancy District, 436 P.2d 230 (Utah 1968). The crime 
of drunk driving occurs when the statute is violated whether or 
not damage occurs. 
Another difference is that the crime of drunk driving 
only requires that the statutory blood-alcohol level be 
exceeded or that alcohol impair driving ability. Proving the 
crime of drunk driving does not require proof of express or 
implied malice. Awarding punitive damages requires such a 
finding.3 
Given the fact that prosecutors cannot prosecute all 
criminal acts, society's need to deter such behavior should not 
rest fully on their shoulders. Historically, analytically, and 
by the overwhelming weight of authority, civil punitive damages 
are not inconsistent with the double jeopardy protection. 
In this connection, it is important to realize that 
plaintiff is not arguing that drunk driving in and of itself 
requires an award of punitive damages. Rather, plaintiff 
simply argues that proof of drunk driving is enough evidence of 
implied malice to present a jury question on punitive damages. 
Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or. 1973). Also, even if there 
is some overlap in the proof required to establish the crime of 
drunk driving and civil punitive damages, no mechanism exists 
for trying the criminal and civil matters in one action. 
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POINT VI 
THE COURTfS DAMAGE INSTRUCTION WAS 
PREJUDICIAL UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
As set forth in our opening memorandum, a tort-
feasor is liable for the entire damages when his conduct 
causes a pre-existing, but asymptomatic, abnormality to 
become symptomatic. (Appellant1s Brief, pp. 24-29.) The 
term "lighting up" or "lit up" is a shorthand way of de-
scribing such a situation. Restatement, (Second) of Torts 
§461, Illustrations and 2. Brunson v. Strong, 17 Ut.2d 364, 
412 P.2d 451 (1966) expressly recognizes the general rule by 
stating in just so many words that a person with a pre-
existing condition may recover for "any aggravation or 
lighting up of such a pre-existing condition or abnormali-
ty." (Id.) 
The court's instruction was not proper under the 
facts of this case. The trial court's instruction expressly 
told the jury that plaintiff could not recover anything for 
the pre-existing condition. (R. 305.) To be sure, the 
court's instruction stated that the jury "should consider" 
aggravation. But unlike plaintiff's instruction, it did not 
go on to state that she could recover for any lighting up. 
After explicitly stating that plaintiff could not recover 
12 
for her pre-existing condition, the court's instruction only 
4 
told the jury half of what plaintiff could recover for. 
The failure to inform the jury that it could award 
damages for the entire injury if they found that plaintiff's 
pre-existing condition was asymptomatic prior to the accident 
was prejudicial under the facts of this case. Regardless of how 
adequate such an instruction may have been where the theory of 
the case does not involve the claim that the pre-existing 
condition was asymptomatic prior to the accident, it was not a 
fair instruction in this case. 
Defendant also ignores the fact that the instruction 
only invited the jury to "consider" aggravation in awarding 
punitive damages. It did not instruct the jury that it "had" 
to award damages for aggravation. As pointed out in the 
opening brief, if the jury believed some aggravation occurred, 
it was required to award something for that aggravation. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.22-24.) The amount of damages is 
The trial court's instruction reads as follows: 
You are instructed that the damages that may be 
assessed in this case should not be reduced simply because 
the plaintiff may suffer from a pre-existing or abnormal 
condition. If you find that the plaintiff suffers from an 
abnormal or pre-existing condition which has not been 
proximately caused by the accident, even though it may 
invite your sympathy, you may not assess any damage against 
the defedant for that condition. However, if the accident 
has been a proximate cause of aggravating such pre-existing 
or abnormal condition, that should be considered by you in 
determing general damages. (R. 305.) 
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discretionary, but the requirement that something be awarde* 
for the aggravation is not if the jury found there was som 
aggravation. 
Because of the lack of direction given by the court1 
instruction, the record does not show whether the genera 
damages of $500.00 the jury award included a determination o 
whether the pre-existing condition was aggravated. Such 
small award could have been for the collateral bumps an 
bruises causing only temporary pain common to most accidents. 
An erroneous instruction is presumptively grounds fc 
reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record as 
whole that the jury was not misled. Turner v. Willis, 582 P.\ 
710f 715 (Ha. 1978). In light of the two separate deficienci* 
in the court's instruction, there is a reasonable likelihood • 
believe that a more favorable result would have occurred hi 
the court instructed the jury properly. Under tho 
circumstances, the determination of damages should be reverse 
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Company, 491 P.2d 1208f 1211 (Ut 
1971). 
CONCLUSION 
Factually, there is at least a jury question on t 
issue of whether defendant acted with a conscious reckle 
disregard of the rights of others. Further, the express 
public policy of the state precludes dismissal of the punit: 
damage claim as a matter of law. 
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As far as compensatory damages are concerned, the 
court's instruction did not fairly state the law to be applied 
to this case. It also failed to give the jury required 
positive direction. The case should be remanded for trial of 
the punitive damage issue and retrial of the compensatory 
damage issue. 
DATED this pp* day of February, 1986. 
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